Merger policy is a permission-granting activity by government in which there may be disincentives to seek permission because of the bene…t from having other …rms merge. We set up a sequential merger game with endogenized antitrust policy to study one aspect of these disincentives. In particular, we delineate a pill-sweetening motive for waiting to merge: a small …rm may choose to let other bigger …rms move …rst, in order to get more mergers approved by government. We report the prevalence of pill sweetening to occur in equilibrium and …nd it to hinge on e¢ ciency gains from a merger, di¤erently-sized …rms, …rms'production technology, the presence of an antitrust authority, the alignment of interests between antitrust authorities and …rms, and the number of …rms in the industry.
Introduction
Many government activities take the shape of granting permissions to …rms. The typical picture is that …rms rush to get such permissions, because the number of permissions are limited, and because being without one puts you at a disadvantage in subsequent rivalry. Merger policy is a permission-granting activity that is special, since …rms without a permission, i.e., the non-merging units, often bene…t from other …rms' merging. Thus, it is not clear whether it pays for …rms to rush to merge. In fact, there may be an incentive to hold back on one's own merger plans because of the positive externality exerted by mergers on non-merging …rms.
In this paper, we point to a novel aspect of this incentive to not rush to merge: letting other …rms merge …rst makes it sometimes easier to get one's own merger plans through the antitrust authority -it sweetens the pill and makes it easier for the antitrust authority to swallow it.
In order to discuss the issue, we construct a model of sequential mergers with two key ingredients. First, the antitrust authority takes active part. In particular, while it does not pick merger proposals, no proposal is carried out without the authority's approval. Secondly, …rms di¤er in terms of size and e¢ ciency. The implication is that, in situations where the antitrust authority does not want to approve all merger proposals put before it, the sequence of merger proposals matters for the outcome of the process. And …rms may want to abstain from an early merger proposal if that proposal would mean that this merger, but no further mergers, would be approved. With our model, we show that this can happen in equilibrium, with a …rm abstaining from a merger today in order to sweeten the pill and persuade the antitrust authority to accept a more concentrated industry in the future than it otherwise would.
Firms may abstain from merger in order to free ride on other …rms'mergers. This possibility creates a disincentive for merger. Such free-riding on other …rms' merger is particularly lucrative when the antitrust authority would be interested in allowing some mergers, but not too many. 1 A merger that raises the equilibrium price in the industry bene…ts also nonmerging …rms. If the antitrust authority would allow only a single merger, then a small …rm may be better o¤ passing up on its own opportunity to merge and be on the outside of a big entity with a considerable price rise, than merging itself and being on the inside of a smaller merger with a meager price rise. Thus, the …rm obtains increased concentration in the industry by not merging itself. This is the free-riding motive for not merging.
If, alternatively, the antitrust authority would anyhow allow more than one mergers to take place, then the …rm might improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis its merging partners by arriving late at the bargaining table. The reason for this is essentially the free-riding motive just discussed: a …rm on the outside of a big merged unit has a large inside option and therefore a strong bargaining position when entering negotiations to join the big unit. It would thus pay for a …rm to pass up on an early opportunity to merge in order to strengthen its bargaining position before eventually merging later. This is the bargainingpower motive for not merging. 2 But there is a third possibility, and this is the main focus here. It arises, as indicated already above, in intermediate cases -where the antitrust authority may or may not allow several mergers, and where a …rm, by postponing its own merger proposal, may get more mergers through the antitrust authority than it would if it itself would merge immediately. As our analysis shows, this happens in cases where the …rm is small relative to the other …rms in the industry. To see how this may happen, note that, if allowing a single merger only, the antitrust authority will in many cases want that single merger to be small, i.e., to involve the small …rm. This is particularly so if there has been a big merger in the past, i.e., one not involving the small …rm. In such cases, the authority may approve a second merger if the …rst merger were big but not if it were small. In such intermediate cases, it may pay for a small …rm to pass on an opportunity to merge early in order to entice the antitrust autority to allow an extra merger to take place. We call this the pill-sweetening motive for not merging early.
Our model features a set of …rms as well as an antitrust authority and has two periods. In the …rst period, the …rms and the antitrust authority play a sequential merger game, to be described in more detail shortly. In the second period, the …rms left after any consolidations in the …rst period compete in quantities in a product market. With a focus on a …rm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge, we model one …rm as being of a di¤erent size at the outset than the other …rms in the industry and discuss whether this particular …rm has incentives to abstain from a chance to be part in an early merger. 3 After a merger proposal, the antitrust authority makes a decision whether or not to approve the merger. The only mergers that are carried out are those that pass the scrutiny of the antitrust authority. The agency is assumed to be forward-looking, but unable to commit to any future action. 4 In order to get a picture of the merger game played in the …rst period, consider an industry consisting of three …rms. If the …rst …rm, of a di¤erent size than the other two, decides not to take part in a merger (or if it does but the merger is not approved), then the two other …rms decide whether to merge with each other. If they do, and their proposal is approved, then the …rst …rm reconsiders whether to take part in a merger, since now the situation has changed from the previous stage when a decision not to merge was made. This feature of our model allows the …rst …rm to merge eventually, even when the game starts out with a decision by that …rm not to merge.
There are two things worth noting at this point. First, we only consider pairwise mergers. This is in line with earlier literature, such as Macho-Stadler, et al. (2006) , and also …ts the observation that most mergers are in fact pairwise. Moreover, allowing a proposal to merge immediately to monopoly would not a¤ect results. Secondly, a decision to merge is made jointly by the two …rms involved. For ease of exposition, we model this formally, though, as one …rm …nding a merging partner and deciding whether to merge with it, with an equal sharing of the gains from merger. This equal sharing of gains means that …rm i does not want to merge with …rm j if and only if …rm j does not want to merge with …rm i.
In our analysis, we …nd …ve aspects of our model that are crucial for the occurrence of pill sweetening. The …rst such aspect is the presence of the antitrust authority, as already noted. Clearly, there cannot be a pill-sweetening motive for not merging without the antitrust authority around. It is only when it is there and takes an active part that the number of mergers to be approved is endogenous, so that …rms may have an incentive to set it up to accept more merging.
Although the pill-sweetening motive is our prime interest, we note that also the free-riding motive hinges on the antitrust authority's presence, since this motive comes about from its allowing only a limited number of mergers. The bargaining-power motive, on the other hand, shows up even when the antitrust authority disappears; in fact, the interesting result is rather of the opposite ‡avor: even with the antitrust authority present, cases exist where multiple mergers take place while still it pays for the …rst …rm to delay its own entry into the sequence of mergers.
Secondly, again as already noted above, asymmetry among …rms is crucial in producing pill sweetening: with all …rms of equal size, there is no way the number of approved mergers can be a¤ected by the sequence they arrive in. We model …rm asymmetry in the simplest way possible: we let one …rm di¤er in size from the others, which on the other hand are of equal size. 5 Thirdly, there must be some e¢ ciency gains associated with a merger. Without such gains, the antitrust authority would not have reason to allow any 5 The importance of …rm asymmetry for outcomes of merger games is also stressed by others. Tombak (2002) …nds that introducing …rm asymmetry into the Kamien-Zang (1993) analysis increases the scope for merger to monopoly. Qiu and Zhou (2007) report that …rm heterogeneity is crucial for the creation of a merger wave in their model. Fridolfsson (2007) …nds that, with asymmetry, big …rms will merge -a result resembling ours on the free-riding motive. Cunha and Vasconcelos (2018) discuss sequential mergers in an industry with both Stackelberg leaders and followers. Barros (1998) uses a di¤erent cost structure than ours, and thus a di¤erent kind of …rm asymmetry, that we discuss in more detail in Section 5 below. Gowrisankaran (1999) , in his analysis, simply lets bigger …rms merge …rst, an assumption that …ts well with our prediction that indeed big …rms merge before small ones. merger, and we would not be able to see the interplay between what the agency would allow and what the …rm would like to see happen that we have described above. Also, e¢ ciency gains from merging creates a scope for a rebalancing of the industry through a second merger to enhance welfare. 6 And the presence of e¢ ciency gains creates an incentive for …rms to merge in the …rst place. Like in Perry and Porter (1985) , there is an input factor in total …xed supply and available only inside the industry, making a merger reduce costs for the …rms taking part in it. The crucial industry-speci…c factor can be thought of as human capital: knowledge about doing business in this industry is available inside the industry only, and the more you have of it, the more e¢ ciently you can run your …rm.
Fourthly, …rms'production technology must not be too sensitive to scale. If it is, so that an increase in a …rm's production gets swamped by increases in costs, then the antitrust authority's motivation for accepting mergers vanishes, and the scope for pill sweetening correspondingly disappears.
Finally, there must be su¢ cient alignment between the …rm's interests and those of the antitrust authority. In our model, the antitrust authority is more interested in allowing mergers the smaller the market, since a small market indicates there may be too many …rms in the industry. But if the antitrust authority's aim is to maximize consumer surplus, then mergers will only be allowed for very small markets. In particular, a …rm's incentive to pass up on an initial opportunity to take part in a merger would in such a case only show up for market sizes for which the consumer-surplus maximizing antitrust authority does not allow any mergers. With more weight put on …rms'pro…ts in the antitrust authority's objective function, the scope for allowing mergers increases, and there is eventually an overlap between combinations of market size and …rm asymmetry for which on the one hand the antitrust authority is interested in allowing one or more mergers and on the other hand …rms are interested in waiting to merge. Note that also the free-riding motive to waiting to merge disappears as the antitrust authority's preferences get close to the consumer welfare standard, since then only mergers that lower the price are allowed, which is not much to free ride on. It follows that also the bargainingpower motive disappears in these circumstances. 6 See, e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1990, in particular Sec. III.D) on how the external e¤ect of a merger increases in the concentration of the non-merging …rms in the presence of e¢ ciency gains from a merger. This implies that a merger is more benign, in terms of its external e¤ect, if other …rms have merged before it. 7 Current policy in both the EU and the US is strongly consumer biased; see, e.g., Whinston (2007) . Outside the EU and the US, the picture is mixed. Ross and Winter (2005) argue that Canadian merger policy is close to the total welfare standard. International Competition Network (2011) also lists Australia and New Zealand, as well as some emerging economies, among jurisdictions close to a total welfare standard. It should be noted that Ashenfelter, et al. (2014) and Kwoka (2015) …nd that actual US merger policy has been closer to the total welfare standard than the statutes indicate. And scholars like Carlton (2007) , Blair and Sokol (2012) , and Kaplow (2012) argue in favor of moving US antitrust law towards a total welfare standard. Moreover, Glick (2018) and other so-called neo-Brandeisian scholars argue that the consumer-versus-total welfare discussion misses the point and that more emphasis should be put on market structure. As discussed in the text, the scope for pill sweetening is greatest in In addition to these …ve issues, also the number of …rms in the industry a¤ects the prevalence of pill sweetening to occur in equilibrium. In our main analysis, there are three …rms in the industry. While the three-…rm case makes for a transparent analysis, the scope for pill sweetening is there limited, since it can only happen when the industry ends up in complete monopoly. In cases of more than three …rms, on the other hand, pill sweetening would occur also without the industry ending in a state of monopoly. This is discussed in Section 4, where we present details of the four-…rm case, which shows the prevalence of cases where …rms abstain from an early merger in order to induce the antitrust authority to allow mergers to duopoly. As is evident from that discussion, an increase from three to four …rms means a strong increase in the scope for pill sweetening to occur in equilibrium.
Our analysis has an interesting empirical implication: Big …rms tend to merge before small …rms. We …nd, in particular, that the pill-sweetening motive for waiting to merge occurs only for …rms of size below the industry average. This happens because big …rms merging creates an imbalance that can be used by small …rms in order to entice the antitrust authority to allow also them to merge afterwards. This empirical implication is best spelled out in cases of more than three …rms. Again, see Section 4 on the four-…rm case, where a small …rm, instead of merging now, may choose to take part in a merger later on with another non-merged …rm, thus restoring some of the balance lost after a …rst, big-…rm merger -so that we have a sequence of a big merger followed by a smaller one.
This prediction would, of course, not be possible to get out of a study of equal-sized …rms. Do big …rms merge before small …rms also in real life? For the purpose of answering this, it would be nice to collect data on industries where multiple mergers have been observed, particular in jurisdictions that are close to the total welfare standard. Empirical studies of this issue would anyhow be hampered by our inability to observe any …rms'decisions not to merge. We thus seem to have to resort to case studies. One such study is by Nilssen (1997) , discussing two Norwegian insurance mergers that both were let through, the …rst bigger than the second. Anticipating the present analysis, Nilssen suggests that society would have been better o¤ if the two mergers had been proposed in the reverse order.
The present model belongs to a growing literature on endogenous mergers. According to Horn and Persson (2001a) , a model of endogenous merger is one where more than one merger constellation is possible, and they delineate three distinct approaches to such models. One of them is atemporal, based on cooperative game theory, and exempli…ed by Horn and Persson themselves. The second approach is pioneered by Kamien and Zang (1990) , with the owner of each …rm, in each round of the merger game, setting a bid price for each of the other …rms and an ask price for her own …rm. Finally, there is the bargaining approach suggested by Ray and Vohra (1999) , with bargaining taking place according to a …xed protocol. Our model contains such a …xed protocol, although countries close to the total welfare standard. a very simple one. 8 We di¤er from Ray and Vohra, however, in letting merged units stay in the game so that they can take part in further mergers, whereas their merged units leave the game. Also Macho-Stadler, et al. (2006) let merged units stay in the game. Unlike us, however, they have a random protocol. With asymmetric …rms, such a random protocol would not be appropriate. While Macho-Stadler, et al. (2006) are interested in the outcome of a merger game between identical …rms without any antitrust agency present, our focus is on the e¤ect of the agency's presence, and in particular on how that presence spells out when …rms are di¤erent.
In many analyses of endogenous mergers, it is assumed that only one merger can happen, and so the interest centres on which one; see, e.g., Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005b) . The interest in the literature in the study of sequential mergers, where one merger decision is followed by one or more others, starts with Caves (1991). Kamien and Zang (1993) extend their 1990 paper to a situation where a sequence of mergers is allowed. Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) analyze sequential merger decisions made by disjoint sets of …rms, while FauliOller (2000) and Neary (2007) relatedly analyze sequential mergers in situations where acquirers and targets belong to disjoint sets. Salvo (2010) extends the Nilssen-Sørgard framework in order to discuss sequential cross-border mergers. Garcia, et al. (2018) set up a model of sequential mergers to discuss whether …rms merge in order to facilitate collusion; instead of modeling an antitrust authority explicitly, as we do here, they assume that any merger to monopoly is forbidden. The present study is alone in having the number of mergers carried out determined endogenously.
The need for a forward-looking merger policy in situations with sequential merger decisions is pointed out by Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) , observing that the safe-harbor criterion of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) may accept too many mergers when used myopically. Brito (2005) discusses how the endogenousmerger perspective can provide the antitrust authority with a revealed-preference argument for putting an upper limit on a proposed merger's e¢ ciency gains: a proposed merger must be more pro…table than those not proposed. Seldeslachts, et al. (2009) study empirically whether merger prohibitions have a deterrence e¤ect on future merger proposals.
Incorporating the antitrust authority's decisions into the analysis of sequential mergers, with each decision by …rms to merge followed by a decision by the antitrust authority whether or not to accept, has been done only very recently. In fact, several of the earlier studies explicitly have to restrict …rms from merging to monopoly in order to counter-balance the absence of the antitrust authority from their models. Recent work, starting with Lyons (2003) , does incorporate the antitrust authority and focuses on how the agency's objective as well as features of the merging process -not least important of which is the fact that merger proposals are picked by …rms, not by the authority -a¤ect equilibrium outcomes, themes that also show up in the present work. 8 A protocol is a sequence of proposers and, for each proposer, a sequence of respondents. Our protocol is simple: with pairwise mergers, there is, for each proposer, a single respondent. 9 In addition to Lyons (2003) , see, e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Nocke and Whinston In this line of research, the analyses closest to ours are by Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) , and Nocke and Whinston (2010). Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) model a sequence of two merger decisions, with the antitrust authority being present to approve any merger proposals. 10 They limit themselves to the case of symmetry, where, at the outset, …rms are of equal size; in contrast, it is by introducing asymmetry that we are able to explore both the existence of pill sweetening and the extent of free riding. Their main focus is on the e¤ect of the antitrust authority being myopic. For this purpose, they pay particular attention to cases where, in their model, non-merging …rms exit after a merger. In contrast, we only consider cases where, whatever mergers having taken place, all …rms are pro…table. Moreover, while we also do an analysis of the case of a myopic antitrust authority, in Section 5 below, we keep our sequential merger game while doing so, while Motta and Vasconcelos equate the analysis of a myopic antitrust authority with a static merger game, where only a single merger is on the table. As our analysis shows, myopia has e¤ects on the equilibrium outcome, in particular with respect to the prevalence of the free-riding motive, that such a static approach to myopia does not uncover.
Nocke and Whinston (2010) …nd conditions under which, in a model of sequential mergers, it is optimal for the antitrust authority to evaluate mergers completely myopically. We depart from them in our theory of mergers: in our analysis, the cost of the merged …rm is tied to the sizes of the merging …rms, with bigger mergers having lower costs, while there is no such connection in Nocke and Whinston (2010) . 11 Also, Nocke and Whinston (2010) restrict attention to cases where the sequence of mergers involves disjoint sets of …rms, while we allow the sets of merging …rms to overlap. 12 Finally, we simplify our analysis by having product-market competition at the end only, while Nocke and Whinston (2010) have it after each stage of merger proposal.
Our focus is on …rms' incentives not to carry out a merger in cases where it, seen in isolation, would be pro…table. The opposite concern, namely, …rms' incentives to merge in cases where the merger, seen in isolation, is unpro…table, has been highlighted by several authors. The …rst to discuss the preemptive motive for horizontal merger are Nilssen and Sørgard (1998): a group of …rms may choose to merge in order to stop another merger from taking place. This preemptive motive to merge also shows up in the work of Horn , who allow for e¢ ciency gains from mergers and also allow for …rms to grow organically, i.e., through investments, in addition to through mergers. 1 2 But see Jeziorski (2015) , who, in his study of the US radio broadcasting industry, extends the analysis of Nocke and Whinston (2010) to allow for overlapping mergers. Also Nocke and Whinston (2013) allow overlapping sets of (potentially) merging …rms, but they do not discuss dynamics.
authority into the analysis, though.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model as well as the social optimum. In Section 3, we present the equilibrium outcome and the pill-sweetening motive not to merge early, as well as the other two motives discussed above. In Section 4, we take issue with the model of Section 3 being too focused on …rms' interest in merging to monopoly and discuss an extension to the case of four …rms, in which more of the interest centres on …rms' incentives to merge to duopoly. In Section 5, we discuss how our results hinge on some crucial assumptions made, and we also discuss some possible alterations of our model. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the formal analysis.
The model
We model a game consisting of two parts. The …rst part is a merger game, a sequence of pairwise mergers starting from a status-quo situation of an industry with three independent …rms. 13 The second part is a product-market competition game among the entities that are present after the merger game. We are looking for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the whole game.
The bene…t of focusing on a three-…rm industry is that the analysis is transparent with so few …rms. As discussed in the Introduction, though, some aspects of the pill-sweetening motive for not merging are best spelled out in an analysis of an industry with more …rms than that. We therefore present an analysis of the four-…rm case in Section 4 below. In particular, with four …rms, there may be incentives for pill sweetening in order to obtain a duopoly, while in the present case of three …rms, a sequence of two mergers inevitably leads to complete monopoly.
Following any merger proposal is a decision by the antitrust authority (henceforth, AA) whether to approve the proposed merger or not. The merger game stops when there are no more mergers to form, either because they are not pro…table, because they would not be approved, or because the industry has reached complete monopoly.
At the outset, i.e., before any mergers, the supply side consists of three …rms, belonging to the set S := f1; 2; 3g of …rms.
The product market has an inverse demand given by
where a is a parameter describing the size of the market, 14 and X is total supply from the …rms in the industry. Firms compete by setting quantities, i.e., by playing a Cournot game. 1 3 When we, in our analysis, disregard the possibility of a threewise merger straight to monopoly, we do it without loss of generality. Clearly, such a merger would only be allowed, and therefore only happen, when it would be socially optimum, and so allowing it would not a¤ect the prevalence of pill sweetening. 1 4 The market demand can, in other words, be written:
It is, of course, only because D 0 (p) = 1 -and, correspondingly, p 0 (X) = 1 -that we this simply can interpret a as a demand shifter and thus as a measure of market size.
In order to allow for e¢ ciency e¤ects from mergers, we assume that each …rm at the outset has a cost function given by
where x i is the production quantity of …rm i, P i2S k i = 1, and k i > 0; 8 i. One can think of k i as the amount available to …rm i of a production factor whose total supply in the industry is given. For a given distribution of this factor among the …rms, the formulation in (1) entails constant returns to scale. The more a …rm has available of this factor, however, the lower are the costs of production. 15 We focus on a special case of asymmetrically sized …rms where one …rm, …rm 1, is of a di¤erent size than the other two …rms, which both are of the same size. In particular, we make the assumption that
A merger creates a new unit that has lower costs than the merging …rms. In particular, if a set M S of …rms merge, then the merged entity has a cost function
where x M is the production quantity of the merged entity, and k M = P i2M k i . The outcome of the merger game is a market con…guration, or a partition of S. There are four principally di¤erent such con…gurations: SQ -Status Quo, with no merger and the con…guration SQ := f1; 2; 3g; P O -Partial Out, with a merger between the two …rms other than …rm 1 and the con…guration P O := f1; 23g;
16 P I -Partial In, with a merger between …rm 1 and one other …rm and a con…guration such as P I := f12; 3g; 17 and CM -Complete Monopoly, with a merger between all three …rms and the con…guration CM := f123g. Let denote the set of possible outcomes of the merger game, and let denote the corresponding set of market con…gurations; i.e., := fSQ, P O, P I, CM g, and := A …rm's pro…t is given by
Because of linearity in demand, consumer surplus in outcome is simply
Moreover, as long as all …rms' production quantities are positive, which is assumed in the following, the equilibrium pro…t of …rm i in outcome equals
and total pro…t in the industry in outcome equals
Both the AA and the …rms are forward-looking. This means that, when making a decision, each player compares the eventual outcomes that follow each choice. 19 The AA applies the total-welfare standard when assessing merger proposals, i.e., it seeks the highest T W , where, in outcome ,
where
i is the Her…ndahl index measuring market concentration, with s i := xi X being the market share of …rm i 2 , 2 . In other words, by the total-welfare standard, there are two e¤ects of a merger: it increases concentration and e¢ ciency, and therefore …rms'pro…ts, which is good, and it changes total output, which is good when the change is positive, but very often is bad because the merger entails a lower total output. The AA approves a merger when the former e¤ect outweighs the latter. In Section 5 below, we discuss how equilibrium outcomes are a¤ected by variations in the relative weights put by the AA on consumer surplus and total pro…t, i.e., by the AA getting closer to the consumer welfare standard.
The model has two exogenous parameters: a, which measures the market size; and k, which measures …rm asymmetry. We restrict interest to those combinations (k; a) for which all …rms present produce positive quantities in all the four outcomes outlined above. We denote by Z the set of all such parameter combinations, and this set is also depicted in the Figures we present below.
We assume that a merger is not proposed if it subsequently will be turned down by the AA. In assessing whether a merger is pro…table, a …rm compares the pro…t it gains from this merger with the alternative, which is not to merge. Since …rms are far-sighted, they compare pro…ts obtained from the outcomes that eventually prevail after the various alternatives. We assume that the two …rms involved in a merger engage in Nash bargaining, splitting evenly the extra pro…t gained from merging. For example, when …rm 1 merges with …rm 2 and we move from SQ to P I, …rm 1's share of the merged entity's pro…t is:
In other words, …rm 1 gets its stand-alone pro…t that it would get by not merging,
, plus half of the extra pro…t that is gained from the merger, which is the pro…t of the merged entity minus the two stand-alone pro…ts:
As we see, the two events "…rm 1 merging with …rm 2" and "…rm 2 merging with …rm 1"have the same outcome, also in terms of pro…ts, so that we can use the two terms interchangeably. 20 The merger game -details of which are provided in Figure 1 -consists of eight decision nodes. 21 Four of these nodes are called merger nodes, numbered 1 through 4 in Figure 1 : at each merger node, if that node is reached, a decision whether to propose a merger is made. After a decision to merge follows an AA node, where the AA decides whether to accept the proposed merger; AA nodes are numbered 1A through 4A in Figure 1 .
The game starts out with …rm 1 and one of the other two …rms deciding whether or not to merge; this is node 1 in Figure 1 . 22 Since the other two …rms are of equal size, we randomly assign …rm 2 the role of …rm 1's merging mate. A merger is pro…table if the joint pro…t of the merging …rms is higher following a merger proposal than following a decision not to merge. Note that the crucial issue is not simply whether the pro…t of the merged …rm 12 in situation P I is higher than the sum of their pro…ts in situation SQ. Rather, the …rms at node 1 take into consideration the actions along the equilibrium path following each of their alternatives.
Note that the …gures depicting the merger game single out one …rm at each node as taking the decision whether or not to merge. This serves merely to 2 0 But see Sec 5 for a brief discussion of the e¤ects of having other ways of splitting the gains from merger than equally. 2 1 In a game-theoretic sense, the number of decision nodes is greater than 8. As will become clear in the text, some of our 8 nodes can be reached by di¤erent routes through the graph in Figure 1 . 2 2 Having the di¤erently-sized …rm 1 move …rst is the only interesting case. In Section 5 below, we discuss why having one of the other …rms move …rst is of less interest. Giving …rm 1 the decision power on merging but not the full bargaining power in the negotiations with the merging partner is of little signi…cance for our results, as we discuss in Section 5.
simplify the exposition and has, as already discussed, no signi…cance, since extra pro…ts gained from merging are split equally. If …rm 1 and 2 propose a merger, then the AA next makes a decision whether to approve the merger or not; this is node 1A in Figure 1 . If AA says No, then we are at node 3, in the same situation as if …rm 1 and 2 had decided not to merge; see below. If AA says Yes, then the remaining …rms 12 and 3 are given the choice to propose a merger; this is node 2 in Figure 1 . If these …rms decide not to merge, then the process stops, and we end in a P I situation, with the …rms in f12; 3g playing a Cournot game. If …rms 12 and 3 decide to merge, then AA makes a decision whether to approve or not; this is node 2A in Figure 1 . If AA says No, then the merger game again ends in a P I situation. If AA says Yes, then we arrive at CM , with 123 a monopolist in the industry.
If, at node 1, …rms 1 and 2 decide not to merge (or if, at node 1A, AA says No), then the two equal-sized …rms 2 and 3 decide whether or not to merge; this is node 3 in Figure 1 . If …rms 2 and 3 decide not to merge, then both alternatives of pairwise mergers have been tried -…rm 1 with one other …rm, and the two other …rms together -with negative responses, so that the merger game ends with the SQ outcome.
If …rms 2 and 3 propose a merger, however, we move on to AA deciding whether or not to approve it; this is node 3A in Figure 1 . If the AA does not approve, then again the merger game ends with SQ. If AA approves, on the other hand, then a new situation has arisen with …rms 1 and 23 in place. Next, therefore, these two …rms choose whether or not to merge; this is node 4 in Figure 1 . If no merger is proposed, then the merger game ends in the P O outcome, with the …rms in f1; 23g playing a Cournot game. If …rms 1 and 23 propose to merge, however, then AA has to approve the merger or not; this is the …nal decision node 4A in Figure 1 . If AA says No to the merger, then the merger game ends in P O, while if it says Yes, then we end in CM .
A merger is proposed in this game only if it will be accepted by the AA. We can thus simplify the exposition by subsuming the AA nodes that lie beneath the merger nodes. The simple picture of the merger game is the one given in Figure 2 . As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2 , there are two di¤erent ways to arrive at CM , and we want to keep the two apart in the continuation. Therefore, we denote by CM 1 complete monopoly following from …rms 1 and 2 then …rms 12 and 3 merging (nodes 1-2 in Figure 2 ), while we denote by CM 2 complete monopoly following from …rm 1 …rst not taking part in a merger, then …rms 2 and 3 merging and …nally …rms 1 and 23 merging (nodes 1-3-4 in Figure 2 ). This completes the description of the merger game.
As noted, our focus is on the set Z of combinations (k; a) of …rm asymmetry and market size for which equilibrium quantities are positive in the productmarket stage, irrespective of the outcome of the merger game. Our aim is, for each combination (k; a) 2 Z, to …nd the equilibrium outcome of the game. We do this through backward induction by …rst solving the product-market game in each of the merger-game outcomes. Thereafter, we proceed by looking at each node n 2 N to determine, for each (k; a) 2 Z, what the eventual outcome of the merger game is. The details of the formal analysis are in the Appendix.
We represent the results of our analysis by way of …gures depicting the parameter space, i.e., the set Z of combinations of the two key parameters k and a that are of interest here. Below, starting with Figure 3 , we present several such …gures of the space Z. In these …gures, the market size is measured vertically by the parameter a: the higher is a, the higher is the demand in the market, and thus the larger is the scope for more …rms present in the market. The asymmetry of …rms is measured horizontally by the parameter k. At k = 1 3 , …rms are identical. As k falls from 1 3 , …rm 1, the di¤erently sized …rm, becomes smaller and smaller and has higher and higher costs, while the opposite is the case with the other two …rms. On the other hand, as k increases from 1 3 , it is …rm 1 that becomes the big …rm and has lower and lower costs as k increases, while the opposite is true for the other two …rms, which now are smaller than …rm 1. For a given market size a, the area within the space Z are values of k for which the di¤erence between the …rms is not so big that the small …rm(s) will exit. As a increases, a wider range of …rm asymmetries is viable. Before discussing, in the next Section, the equilibrium outcome of our game, we take a look at the socially optimum market structure, i.e., what a social planner would implement if he could decide the market structure without playing the merger game. 24 The social planner's choice is presented in Figure 3 where, for each (k; a) 2 Z, the socially optimal outcome is given. We see that all four possible market structures are represented. When the market is large (high a) and the …rms are symmetric enough (intermediate values of k), the social planner prefers the status quo (SQ). When …rm 1 is relatively small, the social planner prefers the Partial In (P I) outcome, with …rm 1 merging with one of 2 3 In these …gures, the vertical axis is truncated at 4:5 for convenience. The reason is that, for a < 4:5, not even monopoly is pro…table, whatever k is. 2 4 The procedure to determine the socially optimum market structure is: for each (k; a) 2 Z, identify the market structure that maximizes T W , i.e., that picks the 2 with the highest T W , given in (2) . the other …rms. When, on the other hand, …rm 1 is relatively big, the social planner prefers the Partial Out (P O) outcome, with …rm 1 sitting on the outside while the other two …rms merge. In both instances, the social planner sees the bene…t of small …rms merging in order to save on costs and create balance in the market. Finally, when the market size a is very small, the social planner prefers Complete Monopoly (CM ).
The picture in Figure 3 coincides exactly with the equilibrium outcomes of the game starting at node 1A, where the AA decides whether to accept a merger proposal from …rm 1. This equilibrium outcome is depicted in Figure A3 in the Appendix. This means that the equilibrium outcomes, presented below, deviate from social optimum solely because …rms have the option not to merge at node 1, i.e., to move the merger game to node 3 in Figure 1 rather than to node 1A. 
SQ

Equilibrium outcome
From the equilibrium analysis in the Appendix, the picture in Figure 4 emanates. When comparing this Figure with Figure 3 above, we see that prevalence of two mergers, so that the market ends up in complete monopoly, is higher in equilibrium than in social optimum. We see that also the P O outcome, where there is a single merger between the two equal-sized …rms 2 and 3, is more prevalent in equilibrium than what social optimum prescribes. Note, in Figure  4 , how we have split the CM area in two, CM 1 and CM 2 , corresponding to complete monopoly being reached by …rms 1 and 2 at node 1 choosing to merge or not, respectively. The outcomes SQ, P O, and CM 2 are reached by these …rms not merging at the start of the game, while the outcomes P I and CM 1 are reached by these …rms starting with proposing a merger.
In most cases where …rms 1 and 2 choose not to merge, it would not make a di¤erence whether they did or not, since a merger proposal would have been rejected by the AA at node 1A anyway. The interest centres, therefore, on those cases where these …rms'pro…ts are strictly better from not merging than from merging at node 1. Accordingly, in Figure 5 Figure 5 . Three motives for not merging. Figure 5 highlights the pill-sweetening motive for not merging at the …rst opportunity: …rms 1 and 2 choose not to merge at node 1 in order to get the AA to accept an additional merger, in situations where such an additional merger would not be allowed in case of an immediate merger between these …rms. Such cases occur when …rm 1 is smaller than the other two …rms (i.e., where k < 1 3 ): while the AA would not allow …rm 3, a big …rm, to join …rm 12, it accepts …rm 1, a small …rm, joining the big …rm 23; see the vertically hatched area in Figure  5 . 25 The equilibrium path leading to pill sweetening is depicted in panel (a) of Figure 6 . In that Figure, a thick line emanating from a merger node indicates which decision is taken at that node. Thus, at node 1, …rms 1 and 2 choose not 2 5 The only way the pill-sweetening motive can occur in our model is by …rm 1 in the future joining a unit that has merged in the meantime, i.e., the merged entity 23. With more …rms in the industry at the outset, there is a scope for the pill-sweetening motive to occur also through …rm 1 in the future merging with another …rm than the unit that has merged in the meantime, in order to restore some of the imbalance in the industry created by the …rst merger; see our discussion in Section 4. to merge. At node 2, …rms 12 and 3, if called upon to play, would choose not to merge, since such a merger would be blocked by the AA. At nodes 3 and 4, on the other hand, mergers are proposed and subsequently approved.
In order to complete the picture, Figure 5 also points out occurrences of the other two motives for not merging that we discussed in the Introduction. The bargaining-power motive occurs in cases where the outcome would be complete monopoly whatever the choice of …rms 1 and 2 at node 1 is, even in the presence of an antitrust authority; see the horizontally hatched area in Figure 5 . This happens for market sizes slightly less than for pill sweetening. The corresponding equilibrium play is depicted in panel (b) of Figure 6 . Compared to pill sweetening, we see that market size is now so small that a merger proposal by …rms 12 and 3 at node 2 would have been accepted by the AA at node 2A. This means that …rm 1 can obtain complete monopoly whichever its choice at node 1, but it prefers waiting and joining the merged unit only at node 4. The option to wait is convenient in case …rm 1 is relatively small (k low) and the market is relatively big (a large, conditioned on the AA allowing complete monopoly): When …rm 1 is small, it has limited bargaining power when it stands alone and would get a low share of the equilibrium (monopoly) pro…t if it joins a merger immediately. By letting the other two …rms merge …rst, …rm 1 acquires a stronger bargaining position as it obtains an inside option of free-riding on the others'merger since that merger leads to higher pro…t also for the non-merging …rm 1. That is why, by letting the other two …rms merge …rst, …rm 1 can achieve a higher share of the monopoly pro…t. Finally, we also have instances of the free-riding motive in Figure 5 . There are cases, with a market of medium size, where complete monopoly is not allowed, but where the AA prefers one merger taking place to none and …rm 1 prefers being outside that single merger. The equilibrium play is depicted in panel (c) of Figure 6 . If, starting out in a situation with pill sweetening in Figure 5 , the market size is increased, then the AA would no longer be interested in complete monopoly. Thus, …rm 1 compares the pro…tability of the two singlemerger outcomes P O and P I. Free riding occurs when it is better for …rm 1 to be the outsider to a merger in the P O outcome than being on the inside of a merger in the P I outcome. As shown by the cross-hatched area in Figure 5 , this happens when …rm 1 is slightly smaller than the others: it is more pro…table for it to let the other two …rms merge, enjoying the free ride, than merging with one of them and su¤ering from the contraction in output that follows. In fact, …rm 1, being smaller, obtains more concentration in the industry by not taking part in a merger itself and instead letting the other …rms have the one merger that the AA is going to allow.
A richer model: four …rms
In the three-…rm model of Section 2, a sequence of two mergers is bound to lead to complete monopoly. So while the analysis is more transparent with only three …rms involved, the scope for pill sweetening to be a motivation for not merging early is limited by this: while the AA may be interested in more than one mergers, complete monopoly may be a bit too much for it. To see how the scope for pill sweetening is increased when there are more than three …rms, we present in this Section an analysis of a case with four …rms. We will be able to see how pill sweetening now shows up as an e¤ort by the …rst-moving …rm not so much to get complete monopolization of the market but rather to obtain merger to duopoly: while an immediate merger by …rm 1 may imply only a single merger going through the antitrust authority, passing up on that merger opportunity and instead merging later, to counter another merger that has been carried through in the meantime, opens up for the antitrust authority to accept a second merger if it helps mitigating any imbalance in the industry created by that other merger. As we will see below, with four …rms, that second merger is often between those two …rms that did not already take part in a merger so far. This four-…rm analysis also strengthens the empirical prediction from our model, that big mergers happen before small ones.
The set of …rms at the outset is now S := f1; 2; 3; 4g. Firm 1 is of a di¤erent size then the other three, who are identical. Thus, k 1 = k 2 (0; 1), while
The symmetric case is at k = . We stick to considering pairwise mergers only.
The merger game in the four-…rm case is depicted in Figure 7 and consists of 10 merger nodes. This Figure parallels that of Figure 2 in that it only shows nodes where merger decisions are made and subsumes the AA's decision nodes, where decisions are made whether to accept proposed mergers. The full picture is shown in the Appendix.
In the four-…rm case, there are seven principally di¤erent outcomes of the merger game: SQ -Status Quo, with no merger and the con…guration f1; 2; 3; 4g; P O -Partial Out merger, with a merger between two equal …rms and a con…g-uration such as f1; 23; 4g; P I -Partial In merger, with a merger between …rm 1 and one other …rm and a con…guration such as f12; 3; 4g; F O -Full Out merger, with a merger between all three equal …rms and the con…guration f1; 234g; F I -Full In merger, with a merger between …rm 1 and two of the other …rms and a con…guration such as f123; 4g; AD -Asymmetric Duopoly, with two pairwise mergers, one involving …rm 1, and a con…guration such as f12; 34g; and CMComplete Monopoly, with a merger between all four …rms and the con…guration f1234g. The new outcomes are F O, F I, and AD, all three featuring a sequence of two mergers, which now is one merger short of complete monopoly. We now have …ve di¤erent paths to arrive at the Complete Monopoly outcome; they are marked CM 1 through CM 5 in the Figure. As it turns out, though, only CM 2 and CM 5 occur in equilibrium. Firm 1 has a total of three chances to take part in an merger (nodes 1, 6, and 10 in Figure 7 ), compared to two chances in the analysis above: it may want to join a merger after two of the others have merged (node 6); and if not, we need to check whether it wants to take part in a merger after all three other …rms have merged (node 10). The equilibrium outcome is depicted in Figure 8 . 26 The Figure shows that there is a great variety in possible outcomes, although the F I outcome does not occur in equilibrium for any combination (k; a). It also shows that …rms'decisions to merge again are heavily in ‡uenced by what will get through at the AA. When k is large, so that the industry at the outset consists of the big …rm 1 and three small ones, …rm 1 realizes that its best shot is sitting outside the merger process and letting the small …rms merge, either all three (F O) or at least two of them (P O). When k is small, so that the industry consists of the small …rm 1 and three large ones, there is a potential for at least one of the large …rms to get involved in a merger. If a is not very large, then it is actually possible for all the large …rms to get involved in merger, as in the AD outcome, with two of the large …rms merging with each other and the third one merging with the small …rm 1. When a is very small, there is not room for more than one …rm in the industry, also by the AA's standard, and so we end up with CM . In the opposite end, when a is very large, there is no scope for a merger from the AA's point of view, and SQ, the situation we start out with, is also the …nal outcome.
PO
In Figure 8 , we also highlight the combinations (k; a) for which the …rm has a strategic motive for not merging at once. Note, in particular, the "Pill sweetening AD"region of the Figure; the equilibrium play leading to this outcome is depicted in Figure 9 . In order to obtain a sequence of two mergers, thus turning the industry into an asymmetric duopoly (AD), …rm 1 abstains from taking part in a merger at the outset, thereby avoiding the single-merger P I outcome that would follow from an immediate merger, since the AA would decline any merger proposed at node 2, and instead going for a merger at the next opportunity by joining forces with the other remaining outside …rm at node 6 in Figure 9 . Firm 1 gets, in other words, an extra merger through the AA by itself abstaining from merger in the …rst instance. This happens, as Figure 8 indicates, when …rm 1 is smaller than the other …rms and the market is of medium size.
Note that pill sweetening also shows up in a manner parallel to the earlier analysis: In order to obtain complete monopoly, …rm 1 chooses to pass up on an opportunity to merge, not only once but twice; this is the "Pill sweetening CM 5 " region of Figure 8 . 27 Figure 9. The equilibrium path leading to the "pill-sweeting AD" equilibrium.
All in all, it seems safe to conclude, if only by visual inspections of Figures  5 and 8 , that the prevalence of a …rm passing up on opportunities to merge in order to sweeten the pill for the antitrust authorities is only increasing as the number of …rms in the industry increases.
Discussion
This Section contains a discussion of our results. First, in items (i) through (v) below, we take up the …ve features of our model, already discussed in the Introduction, that are crucial in producing our results. These are: the presence of ef…ciency gains; asymmetry among …rms; the presence of an AA; scale economies; and a su¢ cient alignment of interest among …rms and the AA. Thereafter, in item (vi) below, we discuss the consequences for our analysis of putting restrictions on the AA's ability to being forward-looking when making its decisions. Finally, in items (vii) through (ix) below, we discuss brie ‡y some alternative modelling assumptions having to do with the sequence of moves, the modelling of asymmetry, and the bargaining power among merging …rms.
(i) E¢ ciency gains from merger. The presence of e¢ ciency gains is instrumental in creating an interest on the part of the AA in having mergers to take place. As is evident from Figure 5 above, there is nothing (strictly) to gain from not merging, if no merger would be allowed anyway, with SQ being the outcome.
(ii) Firm asymmetry. Figure 5 also illustrates clearly the importance of …rm asymmetry for our …ndings. Symmetry, i.e., all three …rms being of identical size, shows up in that Figure along the vertical k = 1 3 line. The case of symmetry is not at all able to accommodate the pill-sweetening motive for not merging, since the AA is not a¤ected by the sequence in which mergers occur when …rms are of identical sizes. Pill sweetening only shows up for k < 1 3 , i.e., when …rm 1 is smaller than the others, as indicated by Figure 5 .
The reason that pill sweetening can be a successful strategy when …rm 1 is small is that, by having the two large …rms merge, …rm 1 makes AA more interested in allowing a further merger. This happens in cases where, in terms of welfare, P I CM P O, so that the AA will choose CM over P O, and accept the merger, when …rms 1 and 23 propose to merge at node 4 in Figure  2 , but would choose P I over CM , and reject, if …rms 12 and 3 were to propose a merger at node 2. Such cases where P I CM P O, in the eyes of the AA, show up, on one hand, when …rm asymmetry is such that the AA, among the two single-merger scenarios, prefers P I to P O, i.e., when …rm 1 is the smallest …rm and k < 1 3 , since P I then entails the smaller merger of the two; and, on the other hand, in an intermediate range of the market size, measured by a, where the AA might be interested in allowing an extra merger, so that CM is between P I and P O in terms of welfare, rather than above or below both of them.
Symmetry can, however, accommodate the other two motives to not merge, albeit in a limited way. At k = 1 3 , there is a range of values of a for which the choice for …rm 1 is between outcomes P I and P O. 28 The AA is indi¤erent between the two outcomes in this borderline case of symmetry. But we …nd that …rm 1 strictly prefers P O to P I because of the bene…t accruing from free riding on the other two …rms merging in outcome P O. This result is in line with previous work, such as Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005b) . What does not come out of an analysis like theirs that is restricted to symmetry, though, is that …rm 1, by not merging, can free ride also in many cases where the AA would prefer that the …rm be involved in a merger rather than it being on the outside of one, notably when k < . Moreover, our analysis shows that a value of k slightly above 1 3 takes away the …rm's strategic incentive not to merge, since now also the AA prefers P O to P I.
Note that, while other authors analysing free riding, such as Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005b) , simply assume that exactly one merger takes place, the range of parameter values for which exactly one merger occurs is here endogenously determined from an explicit consideration of the AA's objectives. When the market is big, the AA would not allow even a single merger and …rm 1's incentive to free ride disappears. When the market is small, there is scope for more than one merger and the focus of …rm 1 shifts to its bene…t from multiple mergers. 2 8 That range is h 9 + (iii) The presence of an antitrust authority. This can be illustrated by repeating our analysis, with the di¤erence that all decisions by the AA are taken away. The result of this exercise is presented in Figure 10 showing that, in case there is no AA who can veto mergers, the equilibrium outcome of the simpli…ed game is trivial: complete monopolization of the market for all parameters. Thus, with no AA in place, there cannot be any pill sweetening. Still, …rm 1 has the option to choose the equilibrium path through which such a market structure is formed. Thus, the bargaining-power motive not to merge immediately plays a role. If …rm 1 were to join with another …rm in the very beginning, then it would weaken its inside option in the ensuing bargaining to get the last …rm to join (except if it itself is very large to start with), while after the merger between the other …rms, …rm 1 becomes an outsider and enjoys free-rider pro…ts, strenghtening its bargaining position when joining the merger at a later stage. The outsider's position is stronger the bigger is the market, as it has more opportunities to expand output. Thus, unless …rm 1 is very big (k high) or the market is very small (a low), …rm 1 will decide to wait for the other two …rms'merger. , but …rm 1 bene…ts from getting in late and so chooses not to merge at the …rst opportunity. This is the bargaining-power motive for not merging. Symmetry is not a restrictive assumption to make when discussing this motive. By introducing …rm asymmetry, we are still able to show, though, that this motive is present, when an antitrust authority is around, both when …rm 1 is relatively large (k > ) and when it is relatively small (k < ). 3 0 The exact formula for the curve splitting the two CM 1 and CM 2 regions in Figure 7 is given in (A11) in the Appendix.
to the antitrust authority. To see how this a¤ects our analysis, we introduce a more general cost function than the one in (1). In particular, we now let a …rm's cost be given by
where c 0. If c = 1, then we are back to the main case discussed above, with constant returns to scale. If c 2 [0; 1), then there are decreasing returns to scale, and more so the lower is c. 31 We can also admit some values of c greater than 1, giving rise to increasing returns to scale, as long as second-order conditions are satis…ed. In order to illustrate the equilibrium outcomes when there are non-constant returns to scale in this way, we put a = 20 and depict the outcome in (k; c) space, restricting attention to combinations of k and c where second-order conditions are satis…ed and all …rms produce positive quantities in all outcomes of the merger game; see Figure 11 . As is evident from that Figure, the pill-sweetening motive for not merging early disappears for su¢ ciently decreasing returns to scale, essentially because the antitrust authority's interest in accepting a merger later on disappears. As c decreases, for values of k a bit below symmetry at 1 3 , we see that, for moderately decreasing returns to scale, the antitrust authority will accept one merger only, and so …rm 1 grasps the chance and merges immediately, while for even lower values of c, no merger at all will be accepted by the antitrust authority and so the industry stays in the status-quo outcome.
(v) The welfare standard. The weight put on …rms' pro…ts in the AA's objective function need to be su¢ ciently high in order to ensure the AA is interested in allowing mergers at the same time as …rm 1 is interested in waiting in order to obtain more. A simple way of exploring the consequences of various assumptions on the AA's objective is to write the latter's objective function as
where 2 [0; 1]. Here, measures the weight put on consumer surplus relative to industry pro…t by the AA. In the analysis above, we put = 1 2 , which implies the total welfare standard. With = 1, the AA would be applying the consumer welfare standard, while a value of decreasing from 1 to 1 2 would imply a steady movement from the consumer welfare standard towards the total welfare standard. As discussed in the Introduction, both US and EU merger policies entail an at or close to 1, although retrospective studies indicate that the US policy in practice is closer to the total welfare standard. Elsewhere, for example in Canada, the is at or close to When analyzing our model for di¤erent variations of the AA's objective, we …nd naturally that a stronger weight on consumer surplus makes the AA less interested in allowing mergers. When is high, there is still some scope for the AA allowing mergers. However, this tends to happen only in cases where there are no incentives for …rm 1 to pass up the opportunity to merge at stage 1. In Figure 12 , we illustrate this for the case where market size is …xed at a = 20. Thus, the Figure depicts various outcomes in (k; ) space. Note that the restriction that all …rms be active in all possible outcomes of the merger game implies that we only consider cases where k 2 [0:12; 0:81]. Figure 12 shows the presence of the three motives introduced above for a …rm not to make a merger proposal at the …rst opportunity. As pointed out above, alignment of interests between the AA and the …rms helps in obtaining our results: if, in the case of a = 20 depicted in Figure 12 , the AA were to apply the consumer welfare standard, with = 1, no merger or, when …rm 1 is big, only a merger not involving …rm 1 would be allowed, deleting de facto any opportunity to strategically not propose a merger. Pill sweetening occurs when …rm 1 is small for intermediate values of the AA's weight on consumer surplus. Note also how Figure 12 illustrates that also the free-riding and bargainingpower motives to not merge early disappear as we get close to = 1. (vi) Legal restrictions on the antitrust authority's decisions. In the analysis so far, we assume that the AA is forward-looking when making its decisions. One might object to this that a merger proposal should be judged per se, a view that might put limits on the AA's ability to take into account all repercussions of its decision. However, we regard our assumption to be not too far from reality since, in practice, when an AA considers a merger proposal, it takes into account the possible development of the industry after that merger, such as increased/decreased chances for entry, for collusion -and for further mergers.
Nevertheless, with the view of checking for the robustness of our results with respect to this criticism, we consider here a variation of our model where AA's ability to make its decision based on the future development of the industry is restricted. The extreme way of modelling such restrictions is to assume that AA is myopic, i.e., that it takes its decision without considering that other mergers might follow. For example, at node 1A of Figure 1 , this myopic AA is comparing total welfare in P I with that in SQ, ignoring the fact that, after the acceptance/rejection of the proposed merger between …rms 1 and 2, further mergers might be proposed and accepted. 32 Solving this modi…ed version of our model, we …nd that our qualitative results are con…rmed: there still are strategic reasons for not merging, and all three motives survive in the new model. Figure 13 depicts the equilibrium outcomes and the occurrence of strategic non merging of this new game.
Comparing this Figure with Figure 5 above, we …nd that a restricted AA implies a higher prevalence of CM 1 , i.e., of complete monopoly following from …rm 1 initially proposing a merger. The reason is that the AA, at node 1A, now simply compares SQ and P I, not having in mind that a yes to a merger at this node may lead to a new merger proposal at node 2, where the AA is more inclined to say yes to a merger than it is at node 1A, since it is only in the latter case that the AA can steer the industry over to the P O outcome. Figure 13 . Equilibrium outcomes and strategic regions with a restricted antitrust authority.
Pill sweetening is still there when the AA is myopic. Its prevalence is slightly reduced, though. The reason is that, when the AA decides at node 3A in Figure  1 whether or not to approve the merger between …rms 2 and 3, it is now unable to make a comparison between the eventual outcomes SQ and CM but is limited to comparing the outcomes SQ and P O. This decreases the prevalence of the CM outcome at node 3A, compared to the case of a forward-looking AA, and has in turn the consequence that …rm 1, when the AA is myopic, chooses to merge at node 1, going for the P I outcome, in some cases where it would pass up on the merger opportunity, going for pill sweetening by letting the two other …rms merge …rst, if the AA were forward-looking.
We …nd a considerably increased prevalence of …rms 1 and 2's not merging at node 1 because of free riding. This is because the AA at node 1A, as already discussed, now compares P I to SQ only, so that it is going to accept the merger also in cases where …rm 1 is big, i.e., where k > 1 3 . This opens up both for …rms 1 and 2 to merge when …rm 1 is very big (CM or P I), and for …rms 1 and 2 not to merge even if the merger would be accepted, because …rm 1 prefers being an outsider (P O).
The occurrence of a free-riding motive for not merging also for k > 1 3 means that, in contrast to the case of a forward-looking AA, there are now motives for not merging in order to lower concentration since, for k > 1 3 , P O implies a less concentrated industry than does P I; this happens because the myopic AA simply compares P I with SQ at node 1A, failing to realize that rejecting P I would lead to P O, which both the AA and …rm 1 would like to have when …rm 1 is big.
Not surprisingly, weakening the AA this way leads essentially to equilibrium outcomes that are further away from the social optimum than in the standard model. 33 Details are provided in Section A.4 in the Appendix. (vii) Altering the move sequence. Suppose we let one of the other two …rms, the equal-sized …rms 2 and 3, make the …rst decision whether or not to merge at the …rst stage of the game. Say …rm 2 is the …rst-mover. Since it has two potential merger partners of di¤erent sizes, …rm 2 has three alternatives to choose from: {Merge with …rm 1; Merge with …rm 3; No merger}. If …rm 2 now chooses not to merge, this ends the game. The two possibilities of a …rst merger have been considered already at the …rst stage: a merger between two equal-sized …rms (…rms 2 and 3) and a merger between two di¤erent-sized …rms (…rm 1 and one of the others). This move sequence therefore does not make us able to discuss a …rm's incentive not to merge for strategic reasons: when the …rst movers choose not to merge, it is simply because a merger at node 1 is unpro…table.
(viii) Alternative ways to model …rm asymmetry. An alternative model of …rm asymmetry is the one used by Barros (1998) . Instead of using the notion of a factor that is in …xed total supply in the industry, as we do here, he simply posits a Cournot oligopoly with constant but asymmetric marginal costs. 34 In line with his approach, we could have assumed three …rms, one with a constant marginal cost c > 0 and the other two with an identical and constant marginal cost equal to c + , where 2 ( c; c). In a merger between two …rms with di¤erent costs, the merged entity makes use of the more e¢ cient technology and therefore gets a constant marginal cost equal to min fc; c + g. One problem with this approach, in relation to the issues we discuss here, is the inability to distinguish between the two cases P I and P O. In both cases, the industry consists of two …rms with di¤erent costs, one with marginal cost c and the other with marginal cost c + . 35 (ix) Paying for the right to merge. It can be argued that our results on …rm 1's motivation to pass up on its merger opportunity stem from the …rm not getting enough out of its potential popularity as a merging partner with the current structure of the merger game. If each of the two identical …rms 2 and 3 would prefer merging immediately with …rm 1 to waiting until the two …rms' chance comes to merge with each other later on, then one would think that …rm 1 should be able to play its two suitors up against each other. One way to accommodate this would be to replace …rm 1's merger with …rm 2 at node 1 with an auction between …rms 2 and 3 for the right to merge with …rm 1. We have experimented with a set-up in the spirit of this alternative, in which the Nash bargaining between …rms 1 and 2 in the merger process at node 1 is substituted with …rm 1 making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to …rm 2 while all other merger processes at later nodes are kept as before. Although this change gives …rm 1 a larger gain from merging immediately, it turns out that our results stand essentially unaltered. 36 
Conclusion
While granting permissions is a wide-spread task for government agencies, merger policy is a special kind of permission granting in that the externality exerted on other …rms by one …rm, or rather group of …rms, obtaining a permission is not necessarily negative. This causes disincentives to seek an early permission -not only in order to free ride on …rms getting permission, but also, as we have shown here, in order to get the authorities eventually to grant more permissions.
In order to get a grasp on this issue, we have in this paper introduced a simple model of sequential mergers, enabling us to study …rms' incentives to pass up opportunities to merge. In particular, we point out what we call the pill-sweetening motive for not merging early. This motive occurs in cases where the number of mergers the antitrust authority is willing to accept depends on the order of merger proposals. By holding back its own merger and letting other combinations form …rst, a …rm may get more mergers through acceptance of the antitrust authority. As our analysis shows, this happens only when the …rm is smaller than the others. Thus, an empirical implication of our model is that large mergers happen before small ones.
Among the crucial assumptions of our model, it is worth pointing out two: size asymmetry among …rms in the industry; and some alignment of interest between …rms and the antitrust authorities. Both of them have policy implications. First, while it has been pointed out earlier how a merger leading to a more symmetric industry also leads to a more collusion-prone industry (e.g., Vasconcelos, 2005), we see here that more symmetry may also reduce …rms'incentives to strategically hold back merger proposals. Secondly, the role played by the antitrust authority's objectives has implications for the current discussions on the best objective to impose on a government's competition agency. 37 In line with other contributions in the literature, we …nd, although in a simple model, that an antitrust authority maximizing total welfare leads to strategic behav-iour among …rms -in this case strategically holding back on merger proposals -that is counter to the interests of society and that does not show up when the antitrust authority is strongly consumer biased. As such, our analysis provides further arguments for government to insist on the consumer welfare standard in assessments of merger proposals.
A Appendix
A.1 Some notation
In Sections A.2 and A.3 of this Appendix, we provide the complete solution of the model. In order to do this, we introduce some notation that might seem a bit elaborate for this three-…rm model, but it has been chosen in order to facilitate extensions to cases with more than three …rms. 38 Recall that the set of possible outcomes of the merger game is := fSQ, P O, P I, CM g :
In order to ease notation, we will sometimes need to express an outcome by a single letter: Q = SQ; O = P O; I = P I; C = CM ; and = fQ, O, I, Cg. Furthermore, we denote the set of decision nodes in the merger game by N := f1; 1A; :::; 4; 4Ag; see Figure 1 in the text.
The model has two exogenous parameters: a, which measures market size; and k, which measures …rm asymmetry. As noted in Section 2, we restrict attention to those combinations (k; a) for which all existing …rms produce positive quantities in all the four outcomes outlined above. We do this by, for every 2 and every k 2 (0; 1), restricting a such that a a (k), where, for each 2 , a (k) is described in the next Section. These outcome-wise restrictions can be summarized in the restriction a a (k) := max a SQ (k) ; :::; a CM (k) :
In the following, our attention is thus limited to parameter combinations (k; a) 2 Z := f(k; a) j a a (k)g. Our aim is, for each combination (k; a) 2 Z of market size and …rm asymmetry, to …nd the corresponding equilibrium outcome. We do this through backward induction by …rst solving the product-market game in each of the four situations. Thereafter, we proceed by looking at each node n 2 N to determine, for each (k; a) 2 Z, what the eventual outcome of the merger game is; i.e., we are looking for an outcome partition n of Z at each node, where n := n Z n ; Z n ; ::: o , and Z n consists of all (k; a) 2 Z such that the outcome of the merger subgame starting at node n 2 N is 2 . The equilibrium outcome of the whole merger game then corresponds to 1 , the outcome partition at node 1.
Let M (n) be the entity that makes a decision at decision node n 2 N . M (n) compares the possible outcomes that can follow each of its decisions. Let n denote the set of outcomes that can occur after node n. For example, at node 4A in Figure 1 , 4A = fP O, CM g. Denote by V n Z the relevant region of the parameter space at node n 2 N for the comparison between outcomes ; 2 n ; that is, V n is the set of combinations (k; a) such that taking one of the feasible actions at node n would lead to outcome and taking another one would lead to outcome . De…ne Y m Z as the set of combinations for which decision maker m prefers outcome to outcome , where ; 2 . Let the decision maker at node n be denoted m = M (n). If n is a merger node, then m is a pair of …rms choosing whether or not to propose a merger. If n is an AA node, then m is the AA. We express Z n , introduced in the previous paragraph, as the collection of all parameter combinations for which outcome is preferred by the decision maker M (n) at node n to another outcome in the relevant region of comparison between the two outcomes; to be precise:
Let e N denote the set of end nodes of the merger game. End nodes are not decision nodes, and outcome partitions at end nodes are degenerate: if the merger game ends in outcome 2 at end node e n 2 e N , then the outcome partition of that end node is n Z e n o = fZg. The relevant region at a decision node can thus be constructed recursively through the outcome partitions of the node's immediate successors:
where I n is the set of immediate successor nodes of node n and
is the set of nodes from which outcome is a possible outcome. At every decision node in the present model, however, I n consists of two nodes, so that the expression simpli…es to:
where l; h 2 I n , and l 6 = h, such that l 2 and h 2 .
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A.2 Product-market competition
The outcome of the quantity competition depends on which situation we are in. Below, we go through the four di¤erent situations that may occur in order to characterize the equilibrium in each of them.
Status Quo (SQ): {1,2,3} In this situation, one …rm of size k and two …rms each of size 1 k 2 compete. The …rst-order condition of …rm 1 is: a X x 1 1 k = 0, while the …rst-order condition of …rm s 2 f2; 3g is: a X x s 2 1 k = 0. Imposing symmetry on the identical …rms 2 and 3, we can write these conditions as: 2x 1 + 2x s = a 1 k , and x 1 + 3x s = a 2 1 k . Solving this system, we have
so that having non-negative quantities from all three …rms requires a SQ (k) := max n 3 7k
o , and total quantity is
Partial Solving this system, we have
Total quantity is
Partial In (PI): {12,3} We have one big …rm, 12, of size k + Solving the system, we have
so that non-negative quantities require a a P I (k) := max
Complete Monopoly (CM): {123} In complete monopoly, there is a single …rm, 123, whose …rst-order condition is: a 2x 123 1 = 0. In other words,
so that a CM (k) := 1. Based on the above, we can now be speci…c about the function a (k), which restricts the set Z of combinations (k; a) of interest and is given by the following piecewise relationship:
A.3 The merger game
In order to solve the game, we proceed by backward induction. Consider, therefore, node 4A in Figure 1 , where AA decides whether to approve a merger between …rms 1 and 23. If AA says no to the merger, then the merger game stops in the P O situation, whereas a yes leads to CM ; in other words, 4A = fP O; CM g. The two immediate successors to node 4A are both end nodes, implying that V 
Intuitively, the merger is approved if the market is so small that there is no room for two …rms in the market. Thus, the outcome partition at node 4A is
CM . At node 4, …rms 1 and 23 decide whether or not to propose a merger. Possible outcomes are 4 = 4A = fP O; CM g. The …rms prefer to merge if
the condition in (A3) amounts to
4 0 There are two solutions to the equation a = a A CO (k). We report here only the one that is at least partly within Z. The other one is always outside Z and therefore irrelevant for our analysis and not reported. The same consideration holds for later cases. 
Putting this together, we see that
SQ ; see Figure A1 . Here,
when the market, measured by a, is small, both this merger and the next one (to be proposed at node 4) are accepted by the AA, and the merger game ends in a CM outcome;
when …rm 1 is big (k is large), the AA prefers balancing it by accepting the merger between the two small …rms 2 and 3 here at node 3A but will not allow a merger to CM later on at node 4A; and …nally Z 3A SQ = (k; a) 2 Z j a > max a A CQ (k) ; a A OQ (k) : when the market is large, there is no reason for the AA to allow any merger at all.
At node 3, no merger has taken place so far in the game when …rms 2 and 3 consider whether or not to merge. We have 3 = fCM 2 ; P O; SQg: In parallel to node 3A discussed above, we need to compare SQ with the outcomes CM and P O, but this time from the perspective of …rms 2 and 3 rather than that of the AA; note that we now need to be explicit on which kind of complete monopoly is obtained. Consider …rst the comparison between CM 2 and SQ. The relevant region is V , we note that …rms 2 and 3, if they merge, will eventually end up in the CM outcome. Thus, for …rm 2 at node 3, merger is preferable to no merger if
Since …rms 2 and 3 are identical, we have This leads to the …nding that …rms 2 and 3, in the relevant region, always prefer CM 2 to SQ. In the comparison between P O and SQ, where V 3 OQ = Z 3A P O , we …nd similarly that also P O is preferred to SQ for any (k; a) 2 Z 3A P O . The conclusion for node 3, therefore, is that a merger is proposed whenever it will be accepted at node 3A, i.e., 3 = 3A . Next, we move to node 2A, where the AA decides whether to approve a merger between …rms 12 and 3. The choice is essentially between outcomes P I and CM , i.e., Figure A2 . Complete monopoly is …ne with the AA if the market is small or if …rm 1, and therefore even more so the merged entity 12, are anyway so big that the outside …rm 3 does not make up any reasonable balance.
At node 2, …rms 12 and 3 decide whether or not to join up to create a complete monopoly. The comparison is also here between CM and P I: 2 = fP I; CM g, and V 2 CI = Z. We …nd that a merger is always preferable, and so a merger is proposed whenever it will be accepted: 2 = 2A .
At node 1A, the AA says yes or no to the merger between …rms 1 and 2. If it says no, then the game moves to node 3 in Figure 1 . If it says yes, then the game moves to node 2. Thus, all outcomes are possible at this node: 1A = fCM; P I; P O; SQg. The two outcomes P O and SQ can only occur if the AA says no and moves the game to node 3. Therefore, there is no need to discuss the comparison between the two at node 1A. In the comparison between CM and P O, we note that V (…rm 12 in the case of P I and …rm 23 in the case of P O) and one …rm of size 1 3 (…rm 3 in the case of P I and …rm 1 in the case of P O). With k going slightly below 1 3 , the big …rm gets bigger in the case of P O and smaller in the case of P I. Thus, the AA prefers P I to P O whenever k < 
Finally, in the comparison between P I and CM , there is a possibility for the AA to obtain CM in stead of P I when (k; a) 2 V 1A CI = Z 2 P I \ Z 3 CM . However, for any (k; a) 2 V 1A CI , the AA prefers P I to CM . Our …ndings for node 1A are summarized in Figure A3 . As is evident from that Figure, the AA says no to the merger proposal in order to obtain either SQ or P O. Saying no means moving the game over to node 3. At node 1, …rms 1 and 2 decide whether or not to merge. A merger proposal would move the game to node 1A, where the AA decides whether or not to accept, whereas a decision not to merge would move the game to node 3, where …rms 2 and 3 decides whether or not to merge. The …rst thing to note is that …rm 1's share of the monopolist's pro…t in CM di¤ers between CM 1 and CM 2 . The crucial question is …rm 1's incentive to take part in the node-1 merger. Whereas …rm 1's share of the monopoly pro…t in CM 2 is 
At node 1, …rm 1's share in the merged unit's pro…t, when the …nal outcome is complete monopoly, is (A11) Other comparisons at node 1 are more straightforward. We …nd, in the choice between P I and CM 2 , that …rm 1 always prefers CM 2 in the relevant region. Likewise, it always prefers, in the respective relevant regions, P I to SQ and P O to P I. See Figure 4 in the text for details. Note in particular that the CM region is split in two by the (A11) curve.
A.4 The four-…rm case
In the main text, only the simpli…ed picture of the merger game is provided, in which the AA nodes, where the AA makes decisions whether to accept proposed mergers, are subsumed. Here, in Figure A4 , we provide the full merger game. In two instances, nodes 2 and 6, a merger node is followed by two di¤erent AA nodes, since there are two di¤erent mergers available. The two AA nodes in each of the two cases are kept apart by denoting them 2A and 2B, respectively 6A and 6B. The detailed analysis of this game is in an online appendix. Figure A4 . The four-…rm merger game.
A.5 Restricted AA
In this Section, we provide details of the alternative model with a myopic AA discussed in Section 5.
At node 4A, there is no di¤erence between the behavior of a myopic AA and that of a forward looking one. Therefore, also node 4 is not a¤ected by this new assumption.
At node 3A, the AA is now comparing P O with the status quo without considering that, for some parameters, the merger game leads to complete monopoly. This myopic AA will accept the merger proposal between …rms 2 and 3 if and only if a < a A OQ (k); see (A5). Figure A5 presents the outcomes at node 3A. Comparing Figure A5 with Figure A1 , one can see that the SQ region now is slightly larger. At node 3, …rm 2 will propose any merger that will be accepted at node 3A. At node 2A, as at node 4A, there are no changes. Therefore, there are no changes at node 2 as well.
SQ
At node 1A, the myopic AA makes a comparison only between P I and SQ and accepts the merger proposal between …rms 1 and 2 if and only if a < a A IQ (k); see (A7). The outcomes at node 1A are depicted in Figure A6 . This graph is dramatically di¤erent from Figure A3 . The myopic AA accepts this merger proposal more often than a forward-looking AA would do. In particular, there are now cases where …rm 1 will have the merger accepted and eventually end up with complete monopoly, even when it is very big.
At node 1, equilibrium behavior is almost never a¤ected by the assumption of the AA being myopic. The only di¤erence occurs for a small parameter region where the …rms no longer can obtain complete monopoly merger because the AA, at node 3A, no longer makes any comparison between CM and SQ. Instead, the …rms at node 1 have to settle with the P I outcome in this case. This means that the parameter region giving rise to a decision not to merge because of pill sweetening has been slightly reduced.
Changes in the equilibrium outcome, as depicted in Figure 13 in the text, are otherwise not attributable to changes in …rms'behavior at node 1 but rather to changes in the AA's behaviour at node 1A. In particular, we now have a large region of CM for high values of k. As seen in Figure 13 , there is also a thin slice of a P I region between CM and P O. 
